First Do No Harm: Interpreting the Crime of Aggression to Exclude Humanitarian Intervention

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**FIRST DO NO HARM: INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION TO EXCLUDE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION**

**JOSHUA L. ROOT**

**ABSTRACT:**
The yet to be implemented Article 8 *bis* of the Rome Statute criminalizes, as the crime of aggression, acts of aggression which by their “character, gravity and scale” constitute a “manifest violation” of the Charter of the United Nations. This article argues that Article 8 *bis* must be construed so as to exclude from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction uses of force, which are facial violations of the UN Charter, but which nonetheless comport with the principles and purposes of the Charter, such as bona fide humanitarian intervention unauthorized by the Security Council. This article examines and applies the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state practice, and opinion juris to conclude that such humanitarian intervention is not a use of force per se prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, despite widespread belief to the contrary. Even if Article 2(4) prohibits bona fide humanitarian interventions, humanitarian interventions will not be—by their “character, gravity and scale”—“manifest” violations of the UN Charter, and therefore are not crimes within the competency of the International Criminal Court to punish.

**Abstract:**
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More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later.

--President Barack Obama upon receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 12, 2010, the States Parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) meeting in Kampala, Uganda adopted by consensus a new Article 8 bis for the Rome Statute. Doing so, they defined the crime of aggression for the purposes of the ICC’s statute and addressed the Court’s future jurisdiction over that crime. Article 8 bis (1) defines “the crime of aggression” as:

3 See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, May 31-Jun. 11, 2010, U.N. Doc. R/Con./Res.6 [hereinafter RC/Res.6]; see also Robert Heinsch, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the Future?, GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 713, 715 (2010). Thirty member States must ratify Article 8 bis and the Member States must take further action after January 1, 2017 before the ICC can assert jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 bis, 15 bis(2-3), 15 ter, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The decision by the Member States to confer on the Court this jurisdiction must be taken by the same majority which is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute. As of this writing, only five states have now ratified the Article 8 bis amendment. See UN Treaty Collection, 2013-04-11.
[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.4

Article 8 bis (2) defines “act of aggression” as, “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” 5 Article 8 then specifies examples of acts of aggression.6 Undefined terms such as “character,” “gravity,” “scale,” and “manifest” at first appear ambiguous. Properly construed, however, these terms exclude bona fide humanitarian intervention from the scope of the crime.7 Beth Van Schaack has argued that:

The crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a way that implicates all uses of force that might be construed to constitute a ‘manifest’ violation of the U.N. Charter . . . As a result, the codification of the crime of aggression and the eventual threat of prosecution may chill those uses of force that are protective in nature, such as interventions pursuant to

4 Rome Statute, *supra* note 3, at art. 8 bis(1).
5 *Id.* at art. 8 bis(2).
6 *See id.* at art. 8 bis(2)(a)-(g) (these acts include invasion, bombardment, blockade, etc.)
7 *See* Beth Van Schaack, *The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women*, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477, 491 (2011). ("[S]ome elements that would be required for any valid intervention . . . include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit of a right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil); abuses that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last resort after efforts at diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had failed; a proportional response; and a reasonable prospect of success. In terms of legitimate power, a prioritising of Security Council action, or at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a central feature of modern theorising about humanitarian intervention . . . [a]n additional requirement would be that such an intervention would result in the diminution rather than escalation of violence.”).
the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect [and humanitarian intervention].

This article shows that a reading of Article 8 bis construing humanitarian intervention as a crime before the ICC is unwarranted and unwise. Part I of this article argues that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter should be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) in light of the UN Charter’s human rights provisions, especially Articles 1, 55, 56, and the Preamble. By doing so, it becomes tenable to interpret Article 2(4) so as not to proscribe bona fide acts of humanitarian intervention per se. Part II examines Article 8 bis and shows that excluding humanitarian intervention from the crime of aggression is fully warranted by the Rome Statue, and is even required by its terms. In order for a violation of the UN Charter to be a crime under Article 8 bis it must be a manifest violation. This threshold excludes uses of force, such as humanitarian interventions, that may be facial violations of the UN Charter, but which nonetheless comport with its principles. Further, this article will show that the qualifiers “character” and “gravity” must be construed so as to exclude humanitarian intervention from the crime of aggression’s scope, thereby precluding humanitarian intervention from being a manifest violation of the UN Charter. A discussion of nullum crimen sine lege and a conclusion follows.

II. INTERPRETING THE UN CHARTER’S PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE

Humanitarian intervention is “the use of armed force for the prevention or discontinuation of massive violations of human rights in a foreign State.” The crime of aggression requires an act of aggression

8 Id. at 478-79.
10 See infra Part III.
11 See infra Part III.
which in turn necessitates the use of force. Any discussion on the legality of the use of force, including force used for humanitarian purposes, begins with the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4); however, this must not end there. That article provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” There are two provisions where the UN Charter expressly authorizes the use of force despite Article 2(4). The first is force used in self-defense (Article 51) and the second is the use of force pursuant to a Security Council resolution under its Chapter VII (Articles 43-48) powers. There is no provision specifically addressing humanitarian intervention, and at first blush, the two explicit exceptions appear to be the only lawful uses of force under the UN Charter framework. Upon closer examination; however, it becomes clear that not all other uses of force are per se prohibited by Article 2(4) or any other provision. Unlike self-defense, the argument

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13 See generally Reisman & McDougal, supra note 12 at 192-93.
14 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
15 See id. arts. 39-51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ”) Id. art. 51.
16 But see Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 72 (5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he Charter forbids the use of inter-State force, except in the exercise of self-defence or as a measure of collective security decided upon by the Security Council, [and] any professed
here is not that humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized by the UN Charter; rather, the argument is simply that humanitarian intervention is not prohibited. Since states are free to engage in any conduct they wish so long as it does not violate a proscription of international law, that is all which must be proven. 17

Pursuant to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, which is customary international law, the UN Charter is a treaty and is thus subject to the rules of treaty interpretation. 18 The Vienna Convention provides that provisions of a statute should be interpreted with “ordinary meaning . . . given to the term[s]” in the text. 19 The terms of Article 2(4) seem clear enough, but as International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court) Judge Simma explained, “[t]he ordinary meaning of a term can only be determined by looking at the context in which it is used.” 20 The ICJ emphasized this point in the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) advisory opinion. 21 The relevant context of Article 2(4) is that it is contained in the UN Charter, itself a human rights document (drafted as the full magnitude of the dispensation from this prohibition would be contradictory to the Charter.”). 17 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7), (“Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”).

18 VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 2(1)(a) (“‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”); see also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. Slovak.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 72 (May 23) (Where the ICJ applied the Vienna Convention to the dispute, even though neither state party was a member of the convention, because the convention reflects customary international law; see also, Frequently Asked Questions About Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.

19 VCLT, supra note 9, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).

20 SIMMA, supra note 12, at 20.

Holocaust was coming to light), and must be read in that context.\textsuperscript{22} Human rights are expressly provided for in Articles 55 and 56. UN Charter Article 55 states that “the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”\textsuperscript{23} Article 56 further provides that “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”\textsuperscript{24}

Further, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that treaty provisions “shall [be interpreted in] light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”\textsuperscript{25} This is a crucial point often missed by strict constructionists. “Shall” indicates an imperative; it is not optional.\textsuperscript{26} Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention then explains that the object and purpose of a treaty are determined, \textit{inter alia}, by looking at the treaty’s preamble.\textsuperscript{27} The preamble of the UN Charter provides that its members “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . .”\textsuperscript{28} In his dissent to the \textit{Nuclear Weapons} advisory opinion, ICJ Judge Weeramantry noted that “dignity and worth of the human person” are keynote principles of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{29} More palpably, UN Charter Article I reads: “The Purposes of the United Nations Are [the achievement of] (3) “international co-operation in solving international problems of . . . humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{23} U.N. Charter art. 55.
\textsuperscript{24} U.N. Charter art. 56.
\textsuperscript{25} VCLT, \textit{supra} note 9, at art. 31(1).
\textsuperscript{26} See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the verb “shall” as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . This is the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold.”).
\textsuperscript{27} VCLT, \textit{supra} note 9, at art. 31(2).
\textsuperscript{28} U.N. Charter pmbl.
\textsuperscript{29} Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 441-42 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
\textsuperscript{30} U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3.
Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, the provisions of the UN Charter (including Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force) must be interpreted in conformity with the purposes of the UN Charter. These purposes specifically include the promotion and protection of human rights. Commentators support this position;31 additionally, so do the terms within the UN Charter. It is important to note that Article 2(4) speaks of conduct inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter, not necessarily with the provisions of the Charter.32 Additionally, under the doctrine of effet-utile when a treaty provision is subject to multiple interpretations, “the one that best serves the recognizable purposes of the treaty and its various provisions must be chosen.”33 In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s South-West Africa advisory opinion, Judge de Visscher made it clear that this principle is applicable to the UN Charter:

It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty clauses must not only be considered as a whole, but must also be interpreted as to avoid as much as possible depriving one of them of practical effect for the benefit of others. This rule is particularly applicable to the interpretation of a text of a treaty of a constitutional character like the United Nations Charter.34

Article 2(4) cannot be interpreted to abrogate the very purposes of the Charter, especially its human rights provisions, or to deprive Articles 1, 55, 56 and the Preamble of any meaning. Therefore, the article cannot be construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary

32 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
33 See SIMMA, supra note 12, at 31.
to enforce the principles of the Charter even if force is unauthorized by the Security Council.

There is ample support for the position that a customary rule of international law allowing for just uses of force under Article 2(4) has emerged. The General Assembly carved out an exception for aggression in Resolution 3314, when it defined aggression for the purposes of assisting the Security Council in interpreting the UN Charter. Although adopted by consensus, the General Assembly does not legislate, and therefore Resolution 3314 is not binding on the Security Council. However, the importance for this resolution cannot be ignored. General Assembly resolutions can have great normative effect and at a minimum, Resolution 3314 is expectation-forming and evidence of opinio juris. Crucially, Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute explicitly incorporates Resolution 3314 making it part of the governing law of the ICC. Article 6 of Resolution 3314 states that “[n]othing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions

39 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 5 (stating, “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression . . . ”).
concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.” However, the resolution also explains that its provisions on the definition of aggression are “interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.” Therefore, Article 6 must be read alongside Article 7, which effectively endorses the use of force in support of wars of national liberation and the right of self-determination. Article 7 of the consensus definition of aggression states:

Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3 [giving examples of aggressive conduct, which has been reproduced in Article 8 bis], could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.

The point here is that Resolution 3314—and therefore Article 8 bis—endorses a use of force, at least in some circumstances that are not provided for in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) is not a shibboleth. As reasoned by the General Assembly in the consensus definition of aggression, there are times when the use of force not in self-defense, and not under the aegis of the Security Council, may nevertheless be lawful.

Professor Yoram Dinstein argues that “[p]ursuant to the Charter, the Security Council—and the Security Council alone—is legally competent to undertake or to authorize forcible ‘humanitarian

40 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at 144.
41 Id.
42 Id. at art. 7; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.
43 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 7 (emphasis added); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 71-72.
44 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.
intervention.” 45 Ironically, this ignores the fact that Chapter VII does not provide for humanitarian intervention. Chapter VII does not confer onto the Security Council the power to authorize force to prevent massive human rights violations or to initiate regime change. Instead, it empowers the Security Council to authorize, or compel, military interventions in the cases of threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression—conflicts between states—but only so as to “restore international peace and security.” 46 This grant of authority is narrow. It is Chapter VI, not VII, which vests the Security Council with broad powers to address human rights violations internal to states but of international concern. 47 Chapter VI, however, addresses the “pacific” settlement of conflicts and limits the Security Council’s powers of addressing these matters to undertaking investigations and making recommendations. 48 Nothing in Chapter VI speaks to the authorization of force. When writers like Dinstein argue that the only lawful form of humanitarian intervention is that which is enforced under a Chapter VII mandate, they have already read into the Charter an exception to Article 2(4). 49 This interpretation of Chapter VII is fully warranted, however, because it gives effect to the principals and purposes of the UN Charter.

Moreover, as Slye and Van Schaack note, “it is generally accepted at the international level that treaties are to be treated as living documents. In other words, they are to be interpreted in the context of the time in which they are being applied, and not as they would have been interpreted at the time of their drafting.” 50 The UN Charter must

45 Id. at 94. See also id. at 73 (Arguing that “[n]othing in the Charter of the United Nations substantiates a unilateral right of one State to use force against another under the guise of securing the implementation of human rights”); SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131 (stating “Under the UN Charter, forcible humanitarian intervention can no longer, therefore, be considered lawful”).
46 U.N. Charter art. 39.
47 Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses the “pacific settlement of disputes.” U.N. Charter art. 33.
48 U.N. Charter arts. 34, 36.
49 See note 43, infra.
50 RONALD C. SLYE AND BETH VAN SCHAACK, ESSENTIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2009); see also IAN BROWNlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 (7th ed., 2008) (“[T]he language of the treaty must be interpreted in the light of the
be read in light of state practice, contemporary notions of sovereignty and opinio juris, such as that provided by the General Assembly with the nascent Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P). The UN Charter, in fact, anticipates the continued development of international law. The Preamble provides that an additional purpose of the Charter is “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” The R2P norm, which is one of those other sources, having emerged in the last decades, holds that states have a fundamental duty to protect their people from serious and systematic human rights abuses. The General Assembly, offering strong evidence of opinion juris, explained that, “each individual state has the responsibility to protect [people] from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . through appropriate and necessary means.” Pursuant to this doctrine, “if a state cannot or will not prevent the occurrence of such abuses, then intervention by other actors in the international community, including through the use of force, is justified, subject to certain limitations.” Many states embrace this principle. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which entered into force in 2001, provides that the Union has a “right . . . to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The “Assembly” noted in this provision is

rules of general international law in force at the time of its conclusion, and also in the light of the contemporaneous meaning of terms.”).


52 U.N. Charter pmbl.


54 Id.

55 Gillett, supra note 2, at 851.

56 Organization of African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 1, 2000, art. 4, ¶ h.
composed of the heads of state of the African Union constituency, and not the Security Council.\(^57\) Since the African Union Constitutive Act evidently takes “due account of the Charter of the United Nations,” the fifty-three African states which agreed to this document believe that humanitarian intervention and R2P are compatible with the UN Charter in the absence of a Security Council resolution.\(^58\)

It must be conceded that the ICJ has held in several instances that forcible humanitarian intervention, without Security Council authorization is unlawful.\(^59\) In the Nicaragua case, the court held that the use of force was not an appropriate means of addressing human rights violations in the Central American state.\(^60\) The ICJ further held in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that there were only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force: self-defense and that pursuant to Ch. VII authorization.\(^61\) In the DRC case, the court noted that despite the atrocities ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda was not authorized to use military force within the DRC.\(^62\) On the other hand, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ held that States are obligated “to employ all means reasonably available to them so as to prevent genocide so far as possible”\(^63\) The bona fide nature of the humanitarian interventions in both Nicaragua and DRC were dubious. If a case were to come before the World Court whose facts more strongly suggested the humanitarian intervention was invoked in good faith, the ICJ might rule very differently. Indeed, the ICJ had the opportunity to reiterate the

\(^{57}\) *Id.* at art. 1 (“‘Assembly’” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union”).

\(^{58}\) *See id.* at pmbl, art. 3, (listing the heads of State adopting the Constitutive Act in 2000).

\(^{59}\) Petty, *supra* note 31, at 121.


\(^{61}\) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, 266 (July 8).


(perceived) incompatibility of humanitarian intervention with the UN Charter in the Kosovo advisory opinion and chose not to.64

Moreover, Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force must be considered in light of state practice. In 1990, a West African peacekeeping force—under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—was militarily involved in Liberia without Chapter VII Security Council authorization.65 The UN did not condemn the action and member states largely applauded the intervention.66 The Security Council even adopted a resolution commending the effort and affirming its support.67 This favorable treatment can be largely explained by the humanitarian purposes of the intervention and the ongoing civil war in Liberia that was resulting in large-scale human rights atrocities.68 ECOWAS again intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997 without Chapter VII authorization, with much the same result.69 Most notably, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for a period of seventy-eight days in 1999 without a Security Council mandate, an action unrelated to self-defense.70 The United States-led NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia was intended to protect the repressed ethnic Albanian population in the Kosovo province from an “overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”71 Again, the UN did not

64 See Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22).
66 Id.
70 BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 742.
71 As the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, put it in March 24th 1999: “The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in Kosovo there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent. . . Every means short of force has been tried to avert this
condemn the campaign, though admittedly, it was not uncontroversial.\footnote{72} State practice is actually much more consistent and widespread than these few examples suggest. For example, Russia, one of the archetypical states trumpeting the uncompromising language of Article 2(4), nonetheless invoked humanitarian intervention when it intervened

situation . . . military intervention is legally justifiable . . . ,” quoted in BROWNLE, \textit{id.} at 743; \textit{See also} MALCOLM N. SHAW, \textit{INTERNATIONAL LAW} 1156 (6th ed.) (2008); UKMIL, 70 British Yearbook of International Law, 1999, p. 586, where the UK Secretary of State for Defense stated, “In international law, in exceptional circumstances and to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, military action can be taken and it is on that legal basis that military action was taken.”\footnote{72} \textit{See} Mary E. O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, \textit{What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum and the ICC Statute}, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 189, 202-03 (2012) (referencing, Bruno Simma, \textit{NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects}, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen O’Connell, \textit{The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo}, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002)); \textit{See also}, SHAW, \textit{supra} note 71, at 1157; Gillett, \textit{supra} note 2, at 851; BROWNLE, \textit{supra} note 50, at 744 (noting a “Ministerial Declaration produced by the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 held in New York on 24 September 1999, three months after the NATO action against Yugoslavia had ended.” There, the “Ministers stressed the need to maintain clear distinctions between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. They rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, which has no basis in the UN Charter or international law.”). \textit{Id.} at 744; \textit{See also} DINSTEIN, \textit{supra} note 16, at 338 (stating, the “[f]ailure by the Council to act in the face of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kosovo was distressing. Still, the ‘cure’ for that failure – opening the sluices for unilateral forcible intervention in a manner wreaking havoc on the Charter’s system prohibiting the use of inter-State force save for self-defense or collective security – appears to the present writer worse than the disease.” He further states that “[t]he question whether the situation in Kosovo in 1999 was so agonizing hat it warranted humanitarian intervention from the outside should have been resolved by the Security Council and not unilaterally by NATO.”).
in Georgia in 2008. The fact that few observers would find this conduct to be an example of bona fide humanitarian intervention does nothing to refute the fact that even Russia believes unauthorized humanitarian intervention may be lawful in some circumstances. Some commentators worry that if humanitarian intervention is deemed lawful it will be raised as a convenient excuse by states to advance their own political agendas. “The pitfall,” Dinstein writes, in granting license to unauthorized humanitarian intervention, “is that there can be countervailing subjective opinions as to whether a course of action is just, and there is too much room for abuse of the law in the name of justice.” These concerns are valid. To address those concerns, the international community and the court can apply rigorous guidelines clarifying which forms of humanitarian intervention will be treated as unlawful and which will not be, rather than sticking to the dogmatism that Article 2(4) is absolute. More exacting guidelines, either offered through judicial decisions of the court or through the Elements of Crimes, on the meaning of “character” in Article 8 bis would be an appropriate way of addressing these concerns (see below).

In sum, Article 2(4) must be interpreted so as not to undermine the principles of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) cannot be construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary to prevent massive human rights atrocities from being perpetrated. A state cannot engage in massive human rights violations in contravention of the UN Charter’s principles, and then, with unclean hands, invoke that very same Charter to argue that its political independence and territorial integrity—necessary to continue committing human rights atrocities—are offended by humanitarian interveners. Nevertheless, this issue will remain contentious, and for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the complete contours of Article 2(4) need not be resolved here. Even if accepting, arguendo, that UN Charter Article 2(4) cannot be harmonized with humanitarian intervention, it does not mean that such a use of force will constitute the crime of aggression. An act of

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75 Dinstein, supra note 16, at 74.
aggression—an illegal use of armed force—while a necessary ingredient for the crime of aggression, is not sufficient to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome Statute requires more.

III. MANIFEST VIOLATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER

It may be superfluous to point out that the crime of aggression requires an act of aggression. An act of aggression, however, is not enough to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 8 bis.76 This reflects the pedigree of the consensus definition found in Resolution 3314. Article 5(2) of that resolution states: “A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.”77 The Resolution therefore differentiates “aggression” on the one hand, which gives rise to international state responsibility, and a “war of aggression” on the other, which is criminal.78 The General Assembly clearly signaled that not every act of aggression should constitute a crime, even if one believes that all acts of aggression violate the UN Charter. Acts of aggression that fall short of wars of aggression will not result in individual criminal responsibility, though they might trigger the rules of state responsibility (not dealt with here).79

Where Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute defines the “crime of aggression,” Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of aggression.”78 The Rome Statute, therefore, like the consensus definition, bifurcates crimes and mere acts of aggression. Where Resolution 3314 delineates criminal conduct and state responsibility, Article 8 bis distinguishes crimes adjudicable by the Court and acts of aggression, which are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to punish.80 Since Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of aggression” as a “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,  

76 Gillett, supra note 2, at 855
77 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at art. 5(2).
78 See Dinstein, supra note 16, at 135.
80 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 bis(2).
81 See id., at art. 5 (The Court only has the competency to punish the crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. Article 5(d) speaks of the crime of aggression, and does not contain a provision for acts of aggression).
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the “crime of aggression” must be something different.82 Not all acts of aggression will rise to the level of the crime of aggression. The dividing line between acts and crimes of aggression is provided for in Article 8 bis.83 In order to constitute the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute, “as a threshold requirement” the act of aggression must “by its character, gravity and scale, constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”84

The terms in the threshold qualifier are catnip for lawyers. They appear ambiguous at first and are (mostly) undefined in the Rome Statute.85 Some commentators have expressed their dissatisfaction with the qualifiers and plentiful ink has been spilled attempting to interpret the language used in this provision.86 This section spills a little more (“manifest” is discussed here, “character, gravity and scale” are dealt with in order below). As the Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage acidly puts it, “[t]he adjective ‘manifest’ often functions in suspect ways in legal writing . . . This word is one of those vague terms by which lawyers create an appearance of continuity, uniformity and definiteness that does not in fact exist.”87 Before ultimately settling on “manifest,” the drafters of Article 8 bis considered using “flagrant” or “serious” as triggering thresholds.88 Reportedly, the reason “flagrant” was not adopted is that it was believed the term would “establish a very high

82 Id.
83 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8 bis.
84 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: SECOND REVISED EDITION 636 (2013) (citing Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 bis).
85 See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (noting that the “[d]rafters did not consider how these factors should be defined, leaving it to the Court for interpretation”).
86 See e.g., O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 200; See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 3; See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204.
88 See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204; see also, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 6, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 2006.
threshold, apparently too high.”90 “Manifest,” on the other hand, was thought to establish a threshold higher than that found in Resolution 3314, but not too high.90 Nomenclature is a lawyer’s stock-in-trade, but there is probably no real difference between “flagrant” and “manifest.” According to the Burton Legal Thesaurus, the two words are synonymous.91

At the Kampala Review Conference, some delegations wished to define “manifest violations” as “an obvious illegal violation.”92 Other delegations interpreted the phrase to mean “a violation with serious consequences.”93 A third group interpreted “manifest” to mean that the violation must be both obviously illegal and one with serious consequences.94 No interpretation was agreed upon, but commentators have put forward various suggestions for the meaning of “manifest.”95 In an attempt to define the terms, Paulus refers to the Oxford English Dictionary, which notes that manifest is “clearly revealed to the eye, mind or judgment; open to view or comprehension; obvious.”96 He goes on to state that this definition is of not much help in that, “what, after all is obvious for one, is completely obscure to the other, in particular in international law.”97 Echoing that sentiment, Potter suggests that “manifest” adds nothing to the definition of the crime “but confusion.”98

90 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
96 Paulus, supra note 95, at 1121.
97 Id.
98 O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204.
This is unpersuasive. There is a presumption in treaty interpretation that the drafting parties did not intend ambiguity, and that each word has been included for a reason.\textsuperscript{99} The reason the “manifest” language was adopted was clearly to limit the scope of the crime of aggression. At the Kampala Review Conference, several States leading the effort to include the “manifest” qualifier were involved in NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign.\textsuperscript{100} Some delegates were concerned about the crime of aggression’s potential chilling impact on humanitarian interventions.\textsuperscript{101} It was, supposedly, the “elephant in the room.”\textsuperscript{102} At Kampala, the US delegation’s “single most sensitive proposal was on excluding humanitarian intervention from the scope of draft Article 8 bis.”\textsuperscript{103} O’Connell and Niyazmatov note that other NATO States supported a high threshold for individual criminal responsibility, and that “[t]he delegations supporting the high threshold of ‘manifest’ by ‘character, gravity and scale’ were also those advocating that the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression be narrow.”\textsuperscript{104} No explicit exception for humanitarian intervention was agreed upon, but the “manifest” language was, and it must be read with the understanding that

\textsuperscript{99} COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 726 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.).
\textsuperscript{100} See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03.
\textsuperscript{101} Id. at 202-03 (referencing Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159-75 (2002)).
\textsuperscript{102} Gillett, supra note 2, at 846. See also O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202 (“During the Preparatory Commission’s meeting in 1996, the US representative had already expressed specific concerns about humanitarian intervention. He tried to argue that because the drafters of the UN Charter did not know about humanitarian intervention, the ICC crime of aggression would have to specially provide for it.”).
\textsuperscript{103} Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1205 (2010).
\textsuperscript{104} O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03.
humanitarian intervention is the very sort of conduct the qualifier was intended to exclude.¹⁰⁵

There is textual support for this argument. Although the “manifest” threshold is found in neither the UN Charter nor Resolution 3314, it is elaborated upon in the Vienna Convention.¹⁰⁶ Article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention states that “a violation of domestic law can be invoked as manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.”¹⁰⁷ That provision is used in the context of the validity of treaties, but the presumption is that terms should be used consistently unless provided for otherwise.¹⁰⁸ “Manifest” is also used in two other locations of the Rome Statute.¹⁰⁹ It is elaborated upon once. Rome Statute Article 33 addresses the defense of obedience to superior orders¹¹⁰. Subsection 2 explains that “orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.”¹¹¹ This language is “[f]or the purposes of [Article 33]”¹¹², but this is simply an

¹⁰⁵ The American delegation attempted unsuccessfully to have the following understanding explicitly exclude humanitarian intervention adopted at Kampala:

It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an effort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.

See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483.
¹⁰⁶ See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 726.
¹⁰⁷ VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46(2) at 343. (emphasis added). See also id.
¹⁰⁸ VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46 at 343; see also, id. at art. 31(1) at 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
¹⁰⁹ Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 33(1)(c)(2), 85(3).
¹¹⁰ Id. art. 33.
¹¹¹ Id.
¹¹² Id.
acknowledgement that such orders can never reasonably be interpreted as lawful. 113 “Manifest” is used here as a reasonableness standard and there is no indication that it should be used any differently in Article 8 bis. 114 In fact, the Elements of Crimes, adopted contemporaneously with Article 8 bis, states: “The term ‘manifest’ is an objective qualification.” 115 Objectivity is applied by the reasonableness standard: what a typical person in the actor’s circumstance would understand to be reasonable behavior is objectively reasonable as a matter of law. 116

It is the position here that interpreting the UN Charter so as to allow bona fide humanitarian intervention in the face of serious human rights atrocities is reasonable, despite the lack of Security Council authorization even if it is in technical violation. 117 If it is not a manifest violation, it is not criminal. 118 According to the late Cassese, “[t]he requirement of ‘manifest’ violations of the UN Charter excludes borderline or gray-area cases in an area of law with a lot of blurry regions and focuses on conduct that warrants criminal condemnation.” 119 The “manifest threshold,” indicates that clearly not all aggression will fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and thus the threshold will filter out borderline cases. 120 The “manifest violation” qualifier should, in other words, be interpreted to exclude uses of force

113 For more on the reasonableness standard in an international criminal law context, see Jessica Liang, Defending the Emergence of the Superior Orders in the Contemporary Context, 2 Goettingen J. Int’L L. 871-891, 884 (2010).
114 Id.
115 The crime of aggression, RC/RES.6, Annex II, intro. ¶ 3 (June 11, 2010).
116 VCLT, supra note 9, at art 31.
118 Id.
from the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction, which facially violate the
UN Charter, but nonetheless comport with its principles and purposes.
The reader need not yet be convinced. Even if humanitarian
intervention is a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and even if
humanitarian intervention is a “manifest violation” of the Charter, it is
still not necessarily the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute.
This is because Article 8 bis further qualifies “manifest” by requiring
the act of aggression to have a “character, gravity and scale” which
makes it a manifest violation.121 These parameters are specific and set a
high threshold for individual criminal culpability.122 Specifically, it is
not any manifest violation, but only violations which are manifest
because of their “character, gravity and scale” that are crimes of
aggression under the Rome Statute. Thus, to determine whether an
aggressive act is both a “manifest violation” and criminal, one must
first define these other qualifiers and apply them accordingly. As we
will see, a reasonable interpretation of these qualifiers will exclude
humanitarian interventions.

Before interpreting the qualifiers, the issue of which
combination of the qualifiers need be satisfied must first be addressed.
At Kampala, Understanding No. 7, intended to aid the Court in
interpreting Article 8 bis, was adopted by resolution.124 Understanding
No. 7 provides that, [i]n establishing whether an act of aggression
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,
the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient
to justify a 'manifest' determination. “No one component can be
significant enough” to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.125 This
Understanding reflects the view that prosecutions at the ICC for the
crime of aggression will be confined to only the most serious and
dangerous armed interventions. Yet Understanding No. 7 also adds a
degree of confusion.126 A plain, “strictly grammatical reading” of

121 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8(1).
122 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136.
123 Rome Statute, supra note 3 at art. 8(1).
124 See generally David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression
Under the Rome Statute, 43 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 173, 179
(2011).
125 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Annex III; See also BARRIGA, supra
note 89, at 629.
126 See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 728 (suggesting that the new Rome
Statute provision “actually might have been more easily interpreted
without [the Understandings]”).
Article 8 bis(1) would require all three qualifiers to be satisfied. The qualifiers are written conjunctively. Understanding No. 7, however, suggests only two metrics need to be met. Rather than limit Article 8 bis as the United States intended, Understanding No. 7 may actually expand it. Further, the Understanding erroneously refers to an act of aggression, but Article 8 bis(2)—defining acts of aggression—does not require any determination of “manifest violation” or of satisfaction of the three qualifiers. Those requirements deal with the crime of aggression and are contained in Article 8 bis(1), where, as Schafer notes, “there already exists the triple-hitter standard of ‘character, gravity, and scale’ . . . .” Simply, Understanding No. 7 refers to the wrong section of Article 8.

The Court could simply disregard Understanding No. 7 as being patently erroneous. Elsewhere, however, the ICC has read “and” in the Rome Statute to mean “or” and could do so again even if it disregards the Understanding. Regardless of whether the Court will read Article 8 bis as requiring all three metrics to be satisfied or just some combination of two, humanitarian intervention should be excluded from the crime of aggression. The most logical interpretation of both character and gravity will exclude humanitarian interventions from constituting manifest violations of the UN Charter.

127 Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179.
128 Scheffer concludes that it is doubtful that the ICC judges will create any such magnitude standard anyway based on the erroneous formulation of Understanding No. 7. The simple fact is, “the Rome Statute, as amended, requires no such determination for ‘acts of aggression,’” but only for the crime of aggression. See id. at 180; See also, Heinsch, supra note 3, at 729.
129 Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179.
130 For example, article 30 of the Rome Statute states that “Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.” (emphasis added) There is little doubt that the Court interprets this “and” as “or.” Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 30.
131 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 484.
132 See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 95, at 1120.
A. Character

Resolution 3314 does not use the term “character” to differentiate between acts of aggression or crimes of aggression, nor for any other purpose.\textsuperscript{133} “Character” is not defined in Article 8 \textit{bis}. Consequently, Paulus has suggested that the term is so indeterminate as to be “almost meaningless.”\textsuperscript{134} This author respectfully disagrees. As one of three qualifiers it is self-evident that “character” must mean something other than “gravity” and “scale”. The term suggests a qualitative analysis as opposed to quantitative.\textsuperscript{135} A good faith interpretation of the “character” qualifier will exempt uses of force that may be found to be technical acts of aggression or unlawful uses of force, but which are executed for laudable motives. This qualifier could be the acid test for distinguishing between bona fide unilateral humanitarian intervention and criminal aggression masquerading as humanitarianism.

The “character” qualifier provides an opportunity for the Court to apply the crime of aggression flexibly enough to exclude bona fide but unauthorized humanitarian intervention. The relevant character of an act of aggression should be construed as its motive. In other words, the motive of humanitarian intervention affects the character of aggression. As Van Schaack notes, the term “character” is “elastic” and provides “an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.”\textsuperscript{136} The German delegation to the Preparatory Committee highlighted the relevance of intent.\textsuperscript{137} The importance of intent in aggression has been recognized by scholars.\textsuperscript{138} Glaser, for example, argues that there must

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Van Schaack, \textit{supra} note 7, at 486.
\item Paulus, \textit{supra} note 95, at 1121.
\item Van Schaack, \textit{supra} note 7, at 486.
\item \textit{Id.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
be a special intent (an aggressive purpose) for the crime of aggression to attach in customary international law.\(^{139}\) Under this view, a military incursion for the sole purpose of humanitarian intervention would not constitute aggression.\(^{140}\) Cassese initially disagreed and argued that customary international law prohibits aggression regardless of motive, but later changed his view to agree with Glaser.\(^{141}\) Although a specific intent is not explicitly provided for in the definition of the crime in Article 8 \textit{bis}, a specific intent element is arguably implicated by the “character” qualifier. Reaching the same result by a different interpretive technique, Gillett suggests “the aggression provisions could be read to import an implicit negative element, whereby the Prosecution must prove the absence of a legal justification for the use of armed force.”\(^{142}\) In other words, the Court could shift the burden to the prosecution.\(^{143}\)

If the Court interprets “character” differently, motive could still be raised as a defense once the Court has determined it has jurisdiction over humanitarian interventions. The Court is empowered with the ability to entertain a defense of motive, for example, as part of a defense based on lack of \textit{mens rea}. Article 31(3) of the Rome Statute provides that “At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those \[specifically provided for in the Rome Statute\] where such a ground is derived from \[international\] law.”\(^{144}\) Motive can play a role in international crimes.\(^{145}\) This provision of the Rome Statute “opens the possibility of uncodified defenses being

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\(^{140}\) \textit{Id.}


\(^{142}\) Gillett, \textit{supra} note 2, at 847.

\(^{143}\) \textit{See id.}

\(^{144}\) Rome Statute, \textit{supra} note 3, art. 31(3).

\(^{145}\) \textit{See, e.g.}, Paul Behrens, \textit{Genocide and the Question of Motives}, 10 J. INT. CRIM. JUST., July 2012, at 501, 23.
considered by the Court.”\textsuperscript{146} It is to be read broadly. As Eser notes, “defenses” denote “all grounds which, for one reason or another, hinder the sanctioning of an offence – despite the fact that the offence has fulfilled all definitional elements of a crime.”\textsuperscript{147} Schabas concludes that Article 31(1) “provides the Court with a relatively free hand to consider other defenses, to the extent that they have some basis in the sources of applicable law,” so long as the provision’s procedural rules are complied with.\textsuperscript{148} Such a ground could be a motive related to a use of force, which causes less harm than that anticipated by inaction.\textsuperscript{149}

B. Gravity

A threshold requirement is not something new to international criminal law, or even to the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{150} Crimes against humanity and war crimes both contain threshold requirements. Crimes against humanity must be “widespread and systematic.”\textsuperscript{151} War crimes must constitute a “serious infringement.”\textsuperscript{152} Similarly, the Geneva Conventions contain the “grave breaches” standard for criminal responsibility.\textsuperscript{153} Both Resolution 3314 and the UN Charter envision a

\textsuperscript{146} William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 484 (Oxford University Press 2010).

\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 484 (quoting Albin Eser, Defenses’ in War Crimes Trials, in War Crimes in International Law, 251, 251 (Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory eds., 1996)).

\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 492 (discussing the procedures relating to Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in accordance with article 31(3)).

\textsuperscript{149} See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 31(3). Article 31(3) allows the Court to exclude criminal responsibility if the conduct is permissible under applicable law. That applicable law could be R2P.


\textsuperscript{151} See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.

\textsuperscript{152} Id. art. 8.

\textsuperscript{153} See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 727 (noting that “not all violations of international humanitarian law entail individual criminal responsibility but only those listed in the respective articles of the Geneva Conventions or Additional protocol I”); see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
“continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression.” Resolution 3314 provides a further example in this respect: in order to determine whether a sanctionable act of aggression has occurred, the Security Council may “conclude that such a determination would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.” “Gravity” as a threshold matter represents nothing new.

This qualifier could be read either as a quantitative measure of the kinetic potency of the use of force, or as qualitative consideration of the seriousness of a legal infraction. Van Schaack suggests it is the former. She writes that “gravity” refers to the “severity, magnitude, and consequences of a particular use of force.” That is how the World Court has used the term. The “gravity” metric traces its roots to dicta from the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment (and the Oil Platforms case). In Nicaragua, the ICJ alluded to “measures which do not constitute an armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force.” The ICJ found it “necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.” The World Court further explained that an armed attack...


154 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483.
155 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 2.
156 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (for a suggestion that consequences are qualitative).
157 Id.
158 Id.
160 Nicar., supra note 159, at ¶ 210; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 208.
differed from “a mere frontier incident,” inasmuch as an armed attack must have sufficient “scale and effects.” 162 Similarly, in determining the scope of “gravity,” the office of the prosecutor, which at the time was directed by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, reasoned that several factors must be considered: “the number of persons killed, number of victims of other crimes, especially crimes against physical integrity and the impact of the crimes.” 163 “Gravity” in this sense is a quantitative metric of the scale of force employed, and therefore incorporates the distinction of acts of aggression that warrant close international scrutiny from less significant uses of force.

This is arguably not the correct application of the gravity qualifier in Article 8 bis. Quantitative measurements are already captured by the scale metric, which is discussed below. In fact, the ICJ used the same terminology (“systematic” and “large scale”) to explain “scale” in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Application for Warrants of Arrest). 164 Logically, “gravity” here must

162 Id. at 210. (Dinstein points out that “The assumption that ‘a mere frontier incident’ can have no ‘scale and effects’ is quite bothersome.)
163 LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL ADVISORS OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024_English.pdf. (Although it is arguably not the Prosecutor’s prerogative to be interpreting the Rome Statute the Pre-Trial chamber in Lubanga did limit the scope of “gravity” by requiring the conduct to be either “systematic” or “large scale.” Pre Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 29, January 2007 at 46).
164 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Application for Warrants of Arrest, ¶ 64 (Feb. 10, 2006); but see Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Appeal of Case No. ICC-01/04-125-Us-Exp, ¶ 82 (July 13, 2006) (noting that this definition of gravity is flawed, albeit in obiter dicta); see also MORENO-OCAÑO, supra note 163, at 6 (stating, “We are currently in the process of refining our methodologies for assessing gravity. In particular, there are several factors that must be considered. The most obvious of these is the number of persons killed – as this tends to be the most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our investigations to situations where killing has been the predominant crime. We also look at number of victims of other crimes, especially
mean something different than systematic, widespread, or large scale. Interpreting Article 8 bis to exclude legal grey areas or de minimus infractions of the UN Charter would be in conformity with a number of provisions of the Rome Statute. Article 5(1), for example, provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”165 The Preamble has a similar provision.166 This reflects the language of Resolution 3314, which provides that aggression is “the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.”167 Echoing this, the U.S. was successful in obtaining the following Understanding at Kampala:

It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.168

By signaling out “gravity” the Understanding seems to elevate its significance above character and scale.

The “gravity” metric should be used, therefore, as an analysis of the degree to which a use of force is unlawful. If humanitarian interventions are deemed violative of the UN Charter, the question

165 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at pmbl. (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished…”); see also id. art. 66(3) (which requires the Court to be “convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”).
166 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 1.
167 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at pmbl.; see also Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 484.
168 THE PRINCETON PRESS, supra note 119, at 8; Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, 13th plenary meeting, June, 11, 2010; Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, 13th plenary meeting, June 11, 2010; see Resolution RC/Res.6, June 28, 2010, Annex III, ¶ 7; see Depositary Notification, Nov. 29, 2010, C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8; see generally Van der Vyver, supra note 92.
becomes: how grave is the violation? This interpretation of gravity—the seriousness of a legal breach—is how it is used elsewhere in the Rome Statute. Article 17(d) requires the Pre-trial Chamber, when assessing admissibility of a case, to ensure that those before the Court are of “sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court.”\textsuperscript{169} The prosecutor is also required to make such a determination before initiating investigations.\textsuperscript{170} Although reading article 17(d) and the “gravity” metric together could appear to create a redundancy, this is not the case. There are two separate gravity tests here, but that does not militate in construing “gravity” in Article 8\textsuperscript{bis} any differently than as it is used in Article 17(d). The tests are not duplicative. The “gravity” of the use of force, measured to determine if the crime of aggression is punishable, is higher than the gravity of the situation necessary to warrant the Court’s attention and resources as a general matter. A corollary of this is that the gravity test cannot be lower than the Court’s general threshold for hearing only highly important cases, and it cannot be the same standard. The “gravity” qualifier should be employed to exclude the malum prohibitum infractions of the UN Charter, which are not malum in se (for example, humanitarian interventions).

C. Scale

The scale metric is quantitative. It can also be traced to the Nicaragua case, where, as noted above, the ICJ held that a use of force must have some “scale and effects” to constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{171} Dinstein notes that there is “no doubt that minor acts of aggression – even if enumerated in Paragraph 2 [of 8\textsuperscript{bis}] – would not pass muster as crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”\textsuperscript{172} In other words, the acts may be patently unlawful, but they are qualitatively insignificant enough to (judicially) ignore. There is

\textsuperscript{169} Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17 (Clearly, the question is whether the case is important enough to warrant the Court’s attention. After all, a nuclear detonation which violates a crime will be important enough for the Court’s attention even though it is a one-time event and not widespread.).
\textsuperscript{170} Id. at art. 53.
\textsuperscript{171} See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgments (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 92 (June 27); see Dinstein, supra note 16, at 210 (noting that “[t]he assumption that ‘a mere frontier incident’ can have no ‘scale and effects’ is quite bothersome”).
\textsuperscript{172} Dinstein, supra note 16, at 136.
sufficient authority to confidently posit that relatively minor uses of force—for example, a warning shot across the bow of a ship or the rescue of nationals abroad from airplane hijackers—do not even violate Article 2(4). The “scale” metric recognizes this and makes its satisfaction an explicit requirement for an act of aggression to be a crime under the Rome Statute. Any humanitarian intervention substantial enough to curb atrocities will probably be of a “scale” sufficient to trigger this metric. This qualifier will not exclude humanitarian interventions but it is important, again, to note that both “gravity” and “scale” cannot be read to mean the same thing. “Scale” clearly refers to the level of force used, either in an individual armed attack or in aggregate, and so gravity must mean something different: an analysis how significantly a use of force is a violation of the UN Charter.

IV. **NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE**

Following the adoption of the ICC’s definition of the crime of aggression, the *New York Times* ran an editorial that posited, “What constitutes a ‘manifest’ violation of the charter? The truth is it’s impossible to say.” The *Times* editorial is at least partially correct,

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173 *Id.* (referencing, MARY E. O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 229-230 (Oxford University Press, 2011). O’Connell and Niyazmatov suggest “there is sufficient authority to conclude that ‘minor’ uses of force, including rescue of nationals involving minor force, are not even violations of Article 2(4), let alone serious violations amounting to aggression.” They point out that: “State practice and decisions of the ICJ indicate that some inter-state uses of force might violate the principle of non-intervention or constitute unlawful countermeasures but do not come within the prohibition of Art. 2(4). Police-type operations used to arrest pirates, to stop a vessel by shooting across the bow, or to rescue hostages, for example, may involve the use of force but are treated as too minimal to come within Art. 2(4). Art. 2(4) prohibits armed force of more than a minor or de minimis nature . . . As discussed above, if a use of force does not violate Art. 2(4), it is not aggression. Even a violation of Art. 2(4) will not constitute aggression if it is too minor. Aggression is a serious violation of Art. 2(4).”


and ultimately we won’t know the meaning of “manifest” or “character, gravity, and scale” until the judges at the ICC tell us what they mean. After all, only they can interpret the Rome Statute. Murphy has criticized the ICC’s aggression definition because it provides no real guideposts for what the qualifiers require. Hence, the Rome Statute suffers “from considerable indeterminacy on a central issue.” It would seem that in selecting such an ambiguous term, the drafters of Article 8 bis have vested the judges at the Court with broad discretion in interpreting the crime of aggression. But their discretion is not unfettered. If and when they do interpret the definition of the crime of aggression, they will be bound by the rule of *nullum crimen sine lege.* This is “a fundamental principle of justice that applies to all criminal law systems, [and] requires that the penal law be clear and easily ascertained, and thus provide adequate notice to individuals that certain conduct may result in criminal liability.” As Schabas notes, the “canon of strict construction of penal law is a corollary of the principle of legality. Ambiguity or doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused: *in dubio pro reo.*” The *nullum crimen sine lege* principle was codified in the Rome Statute in order to “reassure States as to the moderation with which the Court will interpret its Statute.” Pursuant to Article 22(2), “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed,” and “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/opinion/06ihtedglennon.html?_r=0.

176 See Rome Statute, *supra* note 3, art. 21. Implicit here is the notion that only the judges on the ICC can interpret provisions of the Rome Statute.


178 Id.


180 SLYE AND VAN SCHAACK, *supra* note 48, at 85.

181 SCHABAS, *supra* note 140, at 410 (referring to Rome Statute article 22(2)).

182 Id. at 723.

183 Rome Statute, *supra* note 3, art. 22(2); DINSTEIN, *supra* note 16, at 140. See generally COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, *supra* note 98; Pre-Trial Chamber II used this canon of interpretation in *Bemba*
Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute will apply to Article 8 bis, and the qualifiers must be interpreted accordingly. Answering what activity would be a manifest violation in terms of Article 8 bis at this point is speculative, and therefore works in favor of a narrow reading—one which excludes humanitarian interventions. Dinstein notes that “the penumbra of uncertainty, which is characteristic of some segments of the contemporary 
jus ad bellum, should not be exaggerated.” Shaw similarly suggests “the right of individual states to intervene by force in the territory of other states” pursuant to R2P and humanitarian intervention is ambiguous. The adjective ambiguous is an antonym of manifest. It follows then that even if an aggressive act purporting in good faith to be lawful as a matter of R2P or humanitarian intervention violates the UN Charter, it is by Shaw’s use of terminology, not going to be a manifestly clear violation sufficient to trigger individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute.

V. CONCLUSION

This article has shown that bona fide humanitarian intervention is not per se prohibited by the UN Charter, and therefore will not necessarily be a violation of Article 2(4). That is not to say that humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized, but rather ultra vires. This is all that must be shown. Even if humanitarian intervention is found to facially violate the UN Charter, however, it will not be a manifest violation because bona fide humanitarian intervention comports with the Charter’s principles. Even if it is found to be a manifest violation, however, a humanitarian intervention will not have the specific character and gravity necessary to be the punishable under Article 8 bis. This is so regardless of whether the Court interprets the qualifiers disjunctively or conjunctively (as shown above, both character and gravity can be understood to exclude humanitarian

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184 See COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 95, at 410.
185 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 148.
186 SHAW, supra note 71, at 1158 (emphasis added).
interventions). Under each of these arguments, the Court lacks jurisdiction to punish an individual for the crime of aggression. The Court need only accept one of these arguments for its jurisdiction to fail.

To some extent, the debate on the crime of aggression is largely academic. The Court still does not have the power to try this crime and may not for a long time. But the power of Article 8 bis lays in its ability to create the normative assumption that humanitarian intervention is not lawful, but criminal. If bona fide humanitarian intervention used as a last resort to protect fundamental human rights is deemed criminal, it would, as Simma puts it, create a split “between law and morality.” Even while arguing that humanitarian intervention is not provided for in customary international law, Simma notes that “[i]t becomes more and more intolerable to see grave violations of human rights within a State and to see other States being banned by public international law from intervening . . .”

It would be self-immolating to construe the Rome Statute in such a way that it undermines human rights by chilling humanitarian intervention. In interpreting the Rome Statute, the judges at the ICC would be wise to heed the admonishment leveled at young medical students to “first, do no harm.” Van Schaack is correct when she says that a broad interpretation of Article 8 bis “may result in more ex post prosecutions of leaders launching aggressive campaigns at the expense of ex ante efforts to halt threatened or ongoing violence.” Without an interpretation of the crime of aggression that excludes humanitarian intervention, there exists a potential to “chill arguably beneficent uses of force.” Because bona fide humanitarian intervention advances few

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188 See supra text accompanying note 3.
189 SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131-132.
190 Id.
191 See generally FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE (Sheila A. M. McLean ed., 2006) (examining patients’ rights and medical practitioners’ duties in observance of those rights, balanced by a duty to meet statutory requirements in the medical field).
or only abstract national interests for the intervening state, they are the most likely forms of force to be chilled. Already states are not “chomping at the bit to intervene in support of human rights.”\textsuperscript{194} Lest we forget, “even in the face of a horrific genocide, the international community found a host of excuses for not intervening more robustly in Rwanda. The codification of a crime of aggression without any humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for inaction in the face of atrocities.”\textsuperscript{195} When the law protects states engaging in massive human rights abuses by criminalizing what may be the only remedy available, the law has failed. Fortunately, as has been shown, it is perfectly possible to interpret the UN Charter so as not to prohibit humanitarian intervention, and for Article 8 \textit{bis} not to criminalize it. A contrary interpretation of these provisions would only strengthen the hand of states engaging in massive human rights violations and would undermine the very principles the ICC and the UN system seek to uphold.


\textsuperscript{195} Van Schaack, \textit{supra} note 7, at 488.