Smart Power for Hard Problems: The Role of Special Operation Forces Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Africa

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Smart Power for Hard Problems:
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and Human Rights in Africa

ABSTRACT:

This article will assess the roles and responsibilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an active proponent of a so-called “smart power” national security strategy. In particular, it will outline the economic, political, and military challenges faced in Africa; specifically, how and why SOCAFRICA is the U.S. force of choice for promoting human rights and rule of law in Africa. With the goals of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives. The concluding comments reflect on how these forces must model “what right looks like,” and provide specific modeling failures, and the consequences when that modeling did not take place.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Special Operations Command — Africa (SOCAFRICA) and “Smart Power”</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Economic, Political, and Military Challenges Faced in Africa</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Surveying SOCAFRICA Efforts to Promote Human Rights and Rule of Law</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. “Modeling what Right Looks Like” and the Consequences when That Does not Happen</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusion</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Special Operations Command —Africa (SOCAFRICA) and “Smart Power”

The U.S.’ AFRICOM just celebrated its fifth anniversary in October 2012 of “standing up” operations and has progressed well beyond “initial operating capability”\(^1\) to act as the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) newest regional unified combatant command\(^2\) in a region of tremendous potential as well as turmoil. AFRICOM was conceived to work closely with the African Union (AU),\(^3\) other regional African institutions, and individual nations in order to “provide unique ‘value-added’ capabilities to enhance already existing U.S. and

\(^2\) At the time of this chapter’s writing there were 10 Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs) within the U.S. Department of Defense; four were organized as functional commands with specific capabilities like Special Operations, as in the case of USSOCOM, and six geographical commands with regional responsibilities like U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). See U.S. Dep’t. of Def., U.S. Joint Publication No. 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, RA.DEFENSE.GOV, 384 (2001), http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf (“unified combatant command — See unified command. (JP 1); unified command — A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. See also combatant command; subordinate unified command. (JP 1).”).
international programs.” As “the military’s first ‘smart power’ command … [AFRICOM has] no assigned troops and no headquarters in Africa itself, and one of its two top deputies is a seasoned American diplomat.” This requires AFRICOM to continue to develop integrated strategies (civil–military), resource bases (economic, political, and military) and tool kits (military and diplomatic capabilities) to achieve American objectives with an “approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American actions.”

Driven by strategic necessity, and policy considerations of retaining a minimal “footprint” on the African continent, the U.S. military has quietly adapted its procedures to primarily employ SOF with great effectiveness, in conjunction with selected conventional forces, to advance AFRICOM initiatives. At the time of this article’s writing, AFRICOM’s only permanent base in Africa was Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, with numerous ongoing unclassified and classified missions including rotating troops and task forces of some 3,200 troops in Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA); including 300 Special Operations personnel working on

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7 Govern, supra note 1, at 294.
organizing raids and strategizing the drone strikes of eight or more Predator drones “flown” by pilots from thousands of miles away, and eight F-15E fighter-bombs for other strike operations.\(^8\) Lemonnier has been described as part of a “constellation” of hush-hush [US] drone, commando or intelligence facilities in East Africa [including] Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the island nation of the Seychelles.\(^9\) While DOD has not confirmed or denied those other locations, Niger’s Ambassador to the US, Maman Sidikou, told the media in early 2013 that his government has agreed to let US drones operate from its territory, a largely desert

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\(^8\) Craig Whitlock, *Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations*, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2012, at C4, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines. For details of the U.S. Government’s “acknowledged,” unclassified site locations in Africa, see LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34003, AFRICA COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA 9-10 (2010). Ploch identified that “AFRICOM’s other Forward Operating Site is on the United Kingdom’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established “bare-bones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as ‘lily pads,’ or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.” Id.

nation on the eastern border of Mali. According to U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander,
Admiral (ADM) McRaven, Special Operators will be
partnering with the State Department and other federal
agencies, as well as friendly foreign militaries, on
“nonkinetic” programs to prevent extremists from
capitalizing on political discontent, ethnic rivalries and
economic frustration to fuel their strategy of terror and
violence in places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and
countries bordering the Sahara Desert.

10 Jamie Crawford & Chris Lawrence, U.S. to base surveillance drones
in Niger, ambassador says, CNN (Feb. 7, 2013),
11 See, e.g., Donald P. Wright et al., ON POINT, TRANSITION TO THE
NEW CAMPAIGN: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM MAY 2003 –JANUARY 2005 (Combat Studies Institute Press,
2008), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps96027/OnPointII.pdf ("[F]rom the
very beginning of the full spectrum campaign [in Iraq], US forces also
mounted broader efforts to build popular support for the new Iraqi
Government and the Coalition project in Iraq. These operations,
sometimes called ‘nonkinetic’ operations, concentrated on the
reconstruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, the establishment of
representative government, the training of ISF, and general efforts to
improve the quality of life for the population.")
12 John M. Doyle, Special Operations Forces Face Growing Problems
in a Shrinking World, INST. FOR DEF. AND GOV’T ADVANCEMENT
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.idga.org/unconventional-
warfare/articles/special-operations-forces-face-growing
problemsin/&mac=idga_oi_featured_2011&utm_source=idga.org&utm
_medium=email&utm_campaign=idgaoptin&utm_content=11/13/12;
See Admiral William H. McRaven, Posture Statement of Admiral
William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special
Operations Command Before The 112th Congress Senate Armed
Services Committee, ARMED-SERVICES SENATE.GOV (Mar. 6,
2012),
http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/stammt/2012/03%20March/
Inheriting the range of special operations missions from Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), and complimenting AFRICOM’s conventional force capability, AFRICOM “stood up” a “theater Special Operations Command for Africa,” (SOCAFRICA) to support the Theater Security Cooperation Program with planning and responding to real world contingencies in fifty-three countries and more than 13 million square miles. Also on October 1, 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for the Special Operations Command and Control Element—Horn of Africa, and on May 15, 2009, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTFTS)—the SOF component of Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Sahara.

The primary focus of the command is on SOF missions that develop African partner capacity, provide assistance, and support theater security cooperation objectives. For SOCAFRICA, however, as with the

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17 Id.
remainder of AFRICOM assets, the challenge is and will remain that its forces must pursue not a unilateral military presence or bilateral military–to–military cooperation, but a “whole of government approach[,]” which “presents a tension between the importance of representing U.S. activities in Africa as peaceful and respectful of African national sovereignty.”¹⁹ Collectively and individually, African nations will continue to raise many challenges surrounding the balance between military power, civil society, and the rule of law.²⁰ With the goals of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives.²¹

II. The Economic, Political, and Military Challenges Faced in Africa

The 2004 U.S. National Military Strategy significantly described Africa as lying in “an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to

²⁰ Govern, supra note 1, at 294.
²¹ Id.
Asia.” Additionally, and similarly troubling, is the observation that “[t]here are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to [U.S.] interests.” Indicative of that regional instability, the U.S. had become “increasingly involved in Africa since the end of the Cold War,” with over “[twenty] U.S. military operations in Africa between 1990 and 2000 and another [ten plus] since 2000.” As ADM McRaven identified to Congress, the U.S. continues to confront a number of challenges from “insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies;” he


23 Id.

specified, that these opponents will try to exploit gaps in U.S. foreign and defense policies that were developed in a more predictable world, with their use of cyberspace as a battlefield making them more adaptable as they seek new ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate. In Africa and elsewhere, “the strategic environment is changing — quickly and constantly.” At greatest risk in Africa are “weakly governed spaces [that] provide favorable operating environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking of humans, weapons, and drugs.” Similarly, numerous other nations with duly constituted governments employ cronyism and favoritism to manipulate the organs of law enforcement and judicial systems, or flaunt international efforts to advance and promote justice. Rule of law and human rights challenges include, but are not limited to, the following in some twenty-first century African nations, governmental entities, organizations, and cultures:

Undeveloped economies,
with limited resource bases
and insufficient employment
and income opportunities for
large segments of the

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26 Id.
population, resulting in widespread poverty.\textsuperscript{28}

High population growth rates further strain the natural environment and local resources while intensifying competition for resources;\textsuperscript{29}

Ethnic diversity or regional factionalism promoting local or particularistic identifications, while hindering the development of a national identification;\textsuperscript{30}

Ethnic or class politics involving competition among leaders of different language, cultural, or regional populations for state positions of political and economic power with the spoils of victory going to supporters;\textsuperscript{31}

Lack of regime legitimacy, as those large segments of the


\textsuperscript{29} Id.

\textsuperscript{30} Id.

\textsuperscript{31} Id.
population not culturally or politically affiliated with the ruling elite and not sharing in the spoils, refuse to recognize the regime as legitimate;\(^{32}\)

Resort to military or police force to maintain power by suppressing political opponents and disgruntled civilians;\(^{33}\)

Violation of economic, civil, and political rights by the regime on the pretext of "national security;"\(^{34}\) and

Openly mocking human rights and democracy, aside from corruption and complicity in criminal and terroristic movements.\(^{35}\)

What should success look like for SOCAFRICA and conventional force engagement of African forces and governments? According to the House of Representatives’ yearly assessment of AFRICOM, national security is a stable environment “where education and public health efforts, improvements in the rule of law, and the reduction of corruption can significantly increase a government’s

\(^{32}\) Id.
\(^{33}\) Id.
\(^{34}\) Id.
ability to combat these new threats.” In summation, AFRICOM’s “foremost mission is to help Africans achieve their own security” and to support African leadership efforts, yet, “they will welcome help in building strong, effective and professional forces.”

III. Surveying SOCAFRICA Efforts to Promote Human Rights and Rule of Law

Part of the SOF “smart power” approach to Africa will involve a mix of direct and indirect approaches to promote stability and security, advancing human rights, and the rule of law. In advancing rule of law principles in Africa, we might look to what the U.S. Department of State (DoS) has attempted to define for Congress as notions of rule of law the U.S. encourages and promotes:

While there is no commonly agreed upon definition for the rule of law, we take it to mean a broad spectrum of activities including a constitution, legislation, a court system and courthouses, a judiciary, police, lawyers and legal assistance, due process procedures, prisons, a commercial code, and anticorruption activities. To successfully implement an emerging rule of law, these activities must proceed somewhat sequentially and not

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According to ADM McRaven, the direct approach will remain a hallmark capability for SOF in order to provide the necessary means to disrupt this threat, while it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, “the indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations; these long-term efforts increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.”

As an effort to advance U.S.–African cooperation and the rule of law in African states, the first Africa Military Legal Conference hosted by AFRICOM concluded on May 21, 2010, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana. This conference brought together legal experts from fifteen African nations to discuss common challenges, including military justice and


39 Posture Statement, supra note 13.

40 Id.
maritime law, and counter-narcotics authorities.\footnote{Kathleen A. Duignan, \textit{Successful Completion of First Africa Military Legal Conference}, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (June 4, 2010), http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4520&lang=0.} Major Joy Primoli of 17th Air Force (Air Forces Africa) and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Tuckey of U.S. Army Africa, led a discussion about the U.S. military justice system and discussed challenges that common law countries face in applying military disciplinary rules to maintain good order and discipline while ensuring that unlawful command influence does not corrupt the system.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Countries using civilian justice systems for military offenses discussed challenges in case processing, including the lack of resources to dispense timely justice.\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

SOF and conventional forces have been involved in promoting, as well as conducting in Africa and elsewhere, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that provides funds for international personnel to attend U.S. military professional training programs.\footnote{U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., Newsroom Documents March 2012, U.S. AFR. COMMAND, \textit{Fact Sheet: International Military Education and Training} (Jan. 2012), http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Document/8841 [hereinafter \textit{Fact Sheet: Int’l Military Edu. and Training}].} The IMET program “specifically targets current and future military and civilian leadership in African nations” and “exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}} AFRICOM highlights that its IMET programs introduce students to “elements of U.S. democracy such as the U.S. judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality issues, and U.S. commitment to human rights” and

\footnote{\textit{Id.}}
promotes force interoperability through “IMET’s mandatory English-language proficiency requirement.”

Of no small significance “IMET training graduates fill key leadership positions in military of many African nations.”

There is also irony in this observation, given that Malian coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo received extensive IMET training in the United States between 2004 and 2010 before leading a military coup of his nation in 2012. Funding for U.S. Africa Command IMET recipient countries in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 was $21.6 million. Projected funding for FY 2012 is $20.4 million. In FY 2011, 1,292 students from forty-seven partner nations throughout Africa participated in IMET-funded training and educational opportunities. With IMET, as with other development and assistance programs, it is the sense of Congress that if a country does “not cooperate with the United States on terrorism or narcotics enforcement, is a gross violator of the human rights of its citizens, or is engaged in conflict or spends excessively on its military,” they will be ineligible to participate in U.S. funded programs.

Other examples of the indirect approach are SOF’s contributions supporting interagency diplomacy and development efforts. Currently, Military Information Support Teams (MIST) and Regional Information Support Teams (RIST) support the Department of State by augmenting and broadening their public diplomacy

46 Id.
47 Id.
49 Fact Sheet: Int’l Military Educ. and Training, supra note 45.
50 Id.
51 Id.
efforts. MIST elements are requested by U.S. Chiefs of Mission and work under their direction to blend the embassy’s Mission Strategic Plan and the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan. SOF elements in AFRICOM and elsewhere also support interagency development efforts by deploying civil–military support elements (CMSE) to address refugees, displaced persons, populations at risk, and humanitarian or disaster assistance. In addition to their work in the Trans-Sahel, “CMSEs are engaged in seventeen countries and are forecasted to expand to twenty countries in FY 2013 and more than thirty countries by FY 2017” to “support population-focused indirect approaches to combat violent extremism.”

The U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau has administered various peacekeeping capacity-building assistance programs since the mid-1990s: the 1996 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program from 1996

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through 2004 evolved into the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) in 2004, then into the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in 2005. The ACRI was designed, according to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “[t]o enhance the capacity of African partner nations to effectively participate in multinational peace support operations,” or in other words, to improve the training and effectiveness of African military forces. The goal of these programs has been “to increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, and small unit operations.”

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Vicki

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56 See Africa Crisis Response Initiative, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/acri.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); see also NINA SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32773, THE GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2009). Serafino notes on this transmogrification of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) that “[b]efore mid-2004, the United States provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under the [Global Peace Operations Initiative] GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however, and is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau. Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.) PM/PPA works closely with DOD offices to plan and carry out the program.” Id.


Huddleston, “[b]y training professional military units that respect civilian control, these militaries become important contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law,” while AFRICOM’s exercises “provide opportunities to African partners to continue perfecting their professional abilities.”\(^{59}\) Huddleston said such training consists of international standards on human rights, including respect for the rule of law, tolerance, and women’s rights.\(^{60}\) SOF pursuing ACOTA and other missions must be conscious of unique and intensifying politico-military “turf issues” and human rights concerns in Africa, since “U.S. military resources and projects are crossing ministerial lines across the continent.”\(^{61}\) Retired Foreign Service Officer Robert Gribben points to the theoretical “key local client for AFRICOM” as being the host Ministry of Defense, yet the additional realities are that “U.S. military resources already go to projects in ministries of water development, women’s affairs, health, [interior, and]


\(^{60}\) Id.

\(^{61}\) Robert E. Gribbin, *Implementing AFRICOM: Tread Carefully*, 85 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 25, (2008); Theresa Whelan, Transcript: *Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes U.S. Objectives For Africa Command*, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1663 ("There are a number of pieces of legislation -- one of them for example is the Leahy Amendment, which requires human rights vetting of every single individual we train. Even if we’re training a large unit, every individual in that unit has to be vetted as best we can with the information that we have for human rights violations to anyone that there is even the smallest bit of suspicion about is removed from the training program."); *See also* Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996) (discussing certain human rights abuses by host nations may trigger restrictions on U.S. funding under the aforementioned Leahy Amendment).
aviation.”

This means it is not enough for SOF to vet military compliance with human rights considerations and promote military capabilities; they must also do so for civilian ministries.

SOCAFRICA and other component commands and AFRICOM assets must integrate their efforts with the AU, a key partner, despite the fact that the AU faces a crisis of legitimacy such that “[t]he AU is being judged on whether it can and will respond effectively to situations of armed conflict [under the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act].”

The AU Constitutive Act states that the Union has the right to intervene “in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide[,] and crimes against humanity.”

They must support AU’s initiatives to build legitimacy and the rule of law, including the “alphabet soup” of allied coalitions, such as: Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), ACOTA, and IMET, the African Coastal Security Program, Foreign Military Financing, the AU Standby Force, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Regional Defense Combat Terrorism (CT) Fellowship Program, and

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62 See Gribbin, supra note 62, at 25.
64 Id.
the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program.\textsuperscript{65} Just as the AU is “being judged on whether the presence of AU or regional peacekeeping forces can resolve complex peace support or enforcement operations,” so too will SOCAFRICA and other AFRICOM assets be judged.\textsuperscript{66} The primary thrust of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{67} However, U.S. operations are

\textsuperscript{65} Id. (“The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”) (\textit{Id.} quoting African Union Constitutive Act art. 4(h), (July 11, 2000), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm). Initiatives to build legitimacy, as outlined by Forest at Slide 10, included the following: Global Peace Operations Initiative; Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program; Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership; East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative; African Coastal Security Program; Foreign Military Financing; African Union Standby Force; Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center; African Contingency Operations Training & Assistance; International Military Education Training; Military Personnel Exchange Program; Regional Defense CT Fellowship Program, and National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Id.}

continuing to expand in Horn of Africa countries such as Somalia and Yemen, and beyond.68

IV. “Modeling what Right Looks Like” and the Consequences when that Doesn’t Happen

I have previously proposed Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for AFRICOM,69 addressing Congressional concerns about each key aspect of force composition, resourcing, and missions, at a time when AFRICOM was still forming such standards and assessing “lessons learned.”70 In hindsight, the outgoing first deputy to the commander for military operations, Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert Moeller, (Retired (RET)) said, “during [the command’s] work in designing AFRICOM and helping guide it through the early years of its existence, a number of lessons have helped inform our decisions and ensure we performed our job responsibly and effectively.”71 Those “lessons learned” have equal applicability to SOCAFRICA as AFRICOM’s sub-unified command:

69 Govern, supra note 1, at 327.
70 Armitage et al., supra note 7.
176
Lesson 1: AFRICOM does not create policy.

Lesson 2: AFRICOM must work hand in hand with the diplomatic corps.

Lesson 3: Keep our footprint in Africa limited.

Lesson 4: AFRICOM is most effective when it listens to the concerns of its African partners.

Lesson 5: Don’t expect instant results. 72

Each of these aspects contribute to a long-term vision AFRICOM shares with its African partners, building capabilities through sustained security programs which, “over time, help support the conditions for economic development, social development, and improvements in health -- so that people will continue to see progress in their lives and growing prosperity in their communities.”73

Even when these “lessons learned” are heeded, and best efforts are made to assess and promote adherence to the highest legal and operational standards, some resulting circumstances may fall short where exemplifying and educating “what right looks like” does not happen. For instance, Malian Army Captain and coup leader Sanogo “attended an English-language instructor course at the Defense Language Institute, a special school for

72 Id.
73 Id.
international military students at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, from August 2004 to February 2005,” then “[n]early three years later, in December 2007, Captain Sanogo returned to the United States, this time for more English language classes at Lackland before attending the Army’s entry-level course for intelligence officers at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, instruction that he completed in July 2008.” Did IMET and other training enhance Sanogo’s ability to plot and conduct his coup, or deter him from committing greater human rights violations than he is accused of having committed? Only time and careful consideration will tell, as the “green arc of instability” from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa becomes less stable through this forcible revolt.

SOF must also scrupulously demonstrate the highest legal, ethical, and moral standards in their personal and professional conduct. What better way to hold the “high ground” and to encourage those being trained and those advised to do likewise? Regrettably, as negative exemplars for African forces and nations within the Area of Responsibility (AOR), come the consequences of

74 Nossiter, supra note 49. Sanogo ultimately “agreed to step down and allow the re-installation of a civilian government. However, at the time of this writing, he has been a continuing obstacle to efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).” See Mark P. Fancher, Beware the Rotten Fruit of AFRICOM Training, BLACK AGENDA REPORT (May 1, 2012, 11:30PM), http://blackagendareport.com/content/beware-rotten-fruit-africom-training.

75 Arc of instability in Africa may turn into battlefield – Moscow’s envoy, RT (Mar. 27, 2012), http://rt.com/politics/mali-africa-arab-spring-538/. Mikhail Margelov, the Kremlin’s special envoy to Africa stressed, “A ‘green arc of instability’ is being formed from the Sahel (the region bordering the Sahara Desert) to the Horn of Africa. Therefore careful monitoring of events in the region is necessary not to allow the transformation of this arc into a battlefield.” Id.
unprofessionalism and criminal misconduct by AFRICOM’s highest uniformed leaders. Pentagon inspector general investigators found that former AFRICOM Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ward (formerly General (GEN)) spent thousands of dollars on inappropriate travel expenses,\footnote{\textcite{muscal2012}} and engaged in several "inappropriate" activities, including "submitting expense reports with extravagant and unacceptable charges, inappropriate use of military staff, and misuse of government funds," involving "not an insignificant sum of money;" as a result, Ward was relieved of command (fired), demoted in rank affecting his lifetime pension, and had a recoupment of $82,000.\footnote{\textcite{starr2012}} Less than six months after Ward’s relief, his outgoing replacement, GEN Carter Ham, head of AFRICOM, relieved Major General (MG) Ralph Baker, commander of the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti, of command on April 4, 2013 and fined Baker a portion of his pay after an administrative hearing and review.\footnote{\textcite{baldor2013}} AFRICOM officials said Ham lost confidence in Baker’s ability to command because of alcohol and sexual

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\textcite{muscal2012}, \textcite{starr2012}, \textcite{baldor2013}
\end{flushright}
misconduct charges involving harassment and inappropriate contact.  

GEN David M. Rodriguez, one of the Army’s most battle-tested officers, assumed command of AFRICOM in April 2013 as Africa confronts a growing threat from Islamic militant groups operating across the continent, and refocuses AFRICOM on core missions, implementing lessons learned, and setting and maintaining the highest professional and personal standards of conduct. He will need to implement strategies to face threats while simultaneously setting and maintaining the highest professional and personal standards of conduct.

V. Conclusion

SOCAFrica has even greater challenges than conventional forces in the AFRICOM AOR regarding physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes

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79 Id.
Rodriguez’s vast experience included commands of joint, combined and interagency operations comprised of conventional forces (heavy armored and airborne light infantry), as well as SOF (Ranger) units. Vandiver, supra; See also Roulo, supra. Rodriguez’s predecessor, as a tribute to outgoing the outgoing AFRICOM Commander, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lauded Ham for “principled and grounded leadership,” and for his “steady hand when times felt very unsteady.” Vandiver, supra; See also Roulo, supra. These comments may have alluded as much to Ham’s decisive and successful operational efforts as to his restoring a command climate of dignity and respect as well as military discipline and adherence to professional ethics.
of employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets; given operational and training element sizes, locations, defensive postures, and close engagement with local populaces; and African government personnel, and host nation military forces.\textsuperscript{81} SOF furtherance of human rights and the rule of law, in every instance, can and must be considered in light of VADM (RET) Moeller’s “lessons learned,” but also measured against and meet the Five SOF Mission Criteria:

It must be an appropriate mission or activity for SOF. The mission or activities should support the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaign or operation plan, or special activities. Mission or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and fully coordinated. Required resources must be available to execute and support the SOF mission. The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.\textsuperscript{82}

As I have previously written, the effective use of SOF will likely mean fewer \textit{in extremis} requirements for direct action or targeted killing of terrorists and other

\textsuperscript{82} Id., at x.
persons threatening U.S. national security like bin Laden. SOCAFRICA will play an indispensable role in aiding African nations with “foreign internal defense” missions; that is, “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” As challenges in Africa arise and continue, so too will AFRICOM’s need for SOF increase, utilizing these highly trained, culturally astute, superbly disciplined uniformed service members to promote and maintain a vigilant and active peace. In this manner, rather than targeting the symptomatic expressions of terror, the United States will instead prescriptively promote the rule of law abroad as one of many measures to eliminate the root causes of terrorism, while maintaining the capability to deliberately and carefully tailor uses of authorized, licit force around the world.

Operating in joint, combined, and interagency operations, SOCAFRICA can and will promote “democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful


85 Govern, supra note 69, at 373.
resolution of conflict” as SOF “diplomat-warriors” coordinate and synchronize U.S. military activities with U.S. diplomatic and economic objectives in Africa.

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87 Governor, supra note 1, at 285.