Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory

Authors

Cassandra Jones Havard, University of Baltimore School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 2001

Abstract

In this article, I argue that Ellison's metaphor of social invisibility—the societal undervaluing of minorities—is analogous to economic invisibility—the denial of fair access to credit to minorities. I then use the metaphor of invisibility as a basis for understanding the contemporary legal problem of predatory lending, or making credit available to borrowers at unreasonably high interest rates. Disguised as credit access to high-risk, underserved borrowers, predatory lending helps to create risk by offering borrowers products that do not adequately measure risk and that are not fairly priced.

Recommended Citation

Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, Symposium Issue on Ralph Ellison and the Law, 26 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1057 (2001)