Document Type
Article
Journal Title
International Journal of the Economics of Business
Volume
24
First Page
329
Publication Date
2017
Abstract
In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications of the average cartel overcharges results for optimal deterrence and antitrust policy.
Recommended Citation
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande,
Comment on “The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies”,
24
International Journal of the Economics of Business
329
(2017).
Available at:
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/1057